Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1992

State of Utah v. C. Dean Larsen : Brief in
Opposition to Certiorari
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwell & McCarthy; John T. Nielsen; David L. Arrington; Joel G. Momberger;
Jon E. Waddoups; Melyssa D. Davidson; Larry R. Keller; Attorneys for Petitioner.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; David B. Thompson; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Utah v. Larsen, No. 920114.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/4058

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

KFU
1*5.9

BRIEF

ELET NO.2£W4 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v'.

t
:

Case No. 920114

t

C. DEAN LARSEN,
Defendant-Petitioner.

t

Category No. 13

:

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT
OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
DAVID B. THOMPSON (4159)
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Respondent
JOHN T. NIELSEN (2408)
DAVID L. ARRINGTON (4267)
JOEL G. MOMBERGER (4634)
JON E. WADDOUPS (5815)
MELYSSA D. DAVIDSON (5941)
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
LARRY R. KELLER
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

FILED

Attorneys for Petitioner
APR 8

1992

CLERK SUPREME COURT
UTAH

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 920114

v.
C. DEAN LARSEN,

Category No. 13

Defendant-Petitioner.
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT
OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
DAVID B. THOMPSON (4159)
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Respondent
JOHN T. NIELSEN (2408)
DAVID L. ARRINGTON (4267)
JOEL G. MOMBERGER (4634)
JON E. WADDOUPS (5815)
MELYSSA D. DAVIDSON (5941)
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
LARRY R. KELLER
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Petitioner

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

ARGUMENT
POINT I

DEFENDANT FAILS TO PRESENT ANY BASIS FOR THIS
COURT TO GRANT REVIEW OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS' HOLDINGS THAT INTENT TO DEFRAUD IS
NOT AN ELEMENT OF THE CRIME OF SECURITIES
FRAUD UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. S 61-1-1(2) (1989)
AND THAT THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE "GOOD FAITH" DEFENSE . 1

POINT II

PETITIONER FAILS TO PRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL
BASIS FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI TO REVIEW THE
COURT OF APPEALS' HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL
COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
ALLOWING THE STATE'S EXPERT WITNESS TO GIVE
OPINION TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE
"MATERIALITY" OF INFORMATION NOT DISCLOSED TO
INVESTORS

i

8

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Page
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980)

2-5

Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989)
Butterfield v. Okubo. No. 900272 (Utah Apr. 7, 1992)

6
....

10

Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991) 9
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983)

2, 4, 5

Ernst S Ernst v. Hochfelder. 425 U.S. 185 (1976)

2

Garvin v. Greenback. 856 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir. 1988)

6

Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974)

8

People v. Johnson, 213 Cal.App.3d 1369, 262 Cal.Rptr.
366 (1989), review denied (Dec. 21, 1989)
6
People v. Mitchell. 175 Mich.App. 83, 437 N.W.2d 304
(Mich. App. 1989), appeal denied. 433 Mich. 895 (1990) . . . 6
People v. Whitlow, 89 111.2d 322, 433 N.E.2d 629, cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 830 (1982)

7

Sparrow v. United States. 402 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1968) . . . . 7
State v. Fries, 214 Neb. 874, 337 N.W.2d 398 (1983)

7

State v. Gunnison. 127 Ariz. 110, 618 P.2d 604 (1980)

7

State v. Larsen. No. 900473-CA, (Utah App. Feb. 7, 1992)

. 1, 8

State v. Ramirez. 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah Apr. 23, 1991) . . 8
State v. Ross, 104 N.M. 23, 715 P.2d 471 (N.M. App. 1986) . . . 7
State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329 (Utah 1991)
State v. Tarzian, 136 Ariz. 238, 665 P.2d 582 (Ariz.
App. 1983)
State v. Tembv, 108 Wis.2d 521, 322 N.W.2d 522 (1982)

ii

8, 9
7
7

United States v. Leuben. 812 F.2d 179 (5th Cir.),
modified. 816 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1987)

9

Van Duvse v. Israel. 486 F. Supp. 1382 (E.D. Wis. 1980) . . . . 6
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES & RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1989)

1-7

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (1989) (amended 1990, 1991)
Utah R. App. P. 46

. . 1, 2, 6
7, 8, 10

Utah R. Evid. 702

9

Utah R. Evid. 704

9

iii

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,

:

v.

:

C. DEAN LARSEN,

:

Case No. 920114

Category No. 13

Defendant-Petitioner. :
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT
OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT FAILS TO PRESENT ANY BASIS FOR THIS
COURT TO GRANT REVIEW OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS' HOLDINGS THAT INTENT TO DEFRAUD IS
NOT AN ELEMENT OF THE CRIME OF SECURITIES
FRAUD UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-1(2) (1989)
AND THAT THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE "GOOD FAITH" DEFENSE
In the court of appeals, petitioner argued that the
trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that "intent to
defraud" is an element of securities fraud under Utah Code Ann.
S 61-1-1(2) (1989).
69.

Br. of Appellant, Case No. 900473-CA, at 60-

The court of appeals rejected this argument on the grounds

that the jury was correctly instructed that "willfully" is the
culpable mental state for criminal liability under section 61-11(2) and Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (1989) (amended 1990, 1991).
State v. Larsen. No. 900473-CA, slip op. at 13-14 (Utah App. Feb.
7, 1992) (a copy of the corrected opinion, issued March 24, 1992,
is contained in the addendum).

Petitioner argues that this Court should review the
court of appeals' decision because it "directly collides with the
interpretation of the related federal provision on which Utah's
Act was patterned and with which Utah's law was intended to
harmonize."

Petition at 5. While he correctly notes that the

legislature adopted the Uniform Securities Act and that section
61-1-1 is a mirror image of section 101 of that act, he
incorrectly implies that section 101 was patterned solely after
Federal Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule X-10B-5. Id.,
at 6 (citing Uniform Securities Act § 101, Official Comment).
The comment to section 101 states in pertinent part:

"This

section is substantially the Security and Exchange Commission's
Rule X-10B-5, which in turn was modeled
Securities

Act of I5JJ[.]"

upon § 17(a)

of

the

Comment, Uniform Securities Act, 7B

U.L.A. 516 (1985) (emphasis added).

Without acknowledging the

comment's additional reference to section 17(a), which is
significant in light of the case law he cites, petitioner then
relies on selected portions of three civil cases from the United
States Supreme Court as support for his claim that "scienter"1
is an element of the crime of securities fraud, in addition to
the element of "willfulness" required under section 61-1-21:
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Aaron v. SEC,
446 U.S. 680 (1980); and Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).

1

Petitioner uses the term "scienter" as it was defined in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976): "intent
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Hereafter, the State
generally will refer to "scienter" as "intent to defraud."

2

In Hochfelder, the issue was "whether an action for
civil damages may lie under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 . • . and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule
10b-5 . . . in the absence of an allegation of intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud on the part of the defendant."

425 U.S.

at 187-88.2 Based on its review of the plain language of
section 10(b) and the legislative history, the Court held that a
private cause of action for damages will not lie under section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 "in the absence of any allegation of
'scienter' —

intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."

Id. at

2

Section 10(b), from which rule 10b-5 derives, makes it
"'unlawful for any person . . . (b) [t]o use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.'" Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 195. Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, . . .
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
Aaron, 446 U.S. at 688. This language is nearly identical to
that contained in section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and
section 61-1-1.

3

193.
Relying on this Hochfelder, defendant asserts that
criminal liability under section 61-1-1(2) requires proof of
intent to defraud, and goes on to imply that Aaron and Dirks were
decided in the criminal context and thus directly support that
conclusion.3

However, both those cases were civil appeals, and

neither provides direct support for defendant's conclusion.

The

issue in Aaron was "[w]hether the Securities and Exchange
Commission . . . is required to establish scienter as an element
of a civil enforcement action to enjoin violations of § 17(a) of
the Securities Act of 1933 . . ., § 10(b) of the Securities
3

By misquoting and mischaracterizing Hochfelder, Aaron, and
Dirks, petitioner leaves a false impression as to the scope of
those decisions. For example, he purports to quote Hochfelder,
425 U.S. at 193 n.12, and states: "There is 'no indication that
any type of criminal or civil liability is to attach [under §
10(b)] in the absence of scienter' — the 'intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud.'" Petition at 8. Although footnote 12
contains the following sentence: "In this opinion the term
'scienter' refers to a mental state embracing intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud.", no sentence even resembling the one
constructed by petitioner appears there, nor does that footnote
stand for the proposition suggested by petitioner. Indeed,
petitioner's purported quote of footnote 12 appears to be a
marriage of the "scienter" language of footnote 12 and an
entirely unrelated sentence at p. 205 of the Hochfelder opinion,
where the Court refers to sections 9(a)(6) and (c) of the
Securities Exchange Act and states: "[T]here is no indication
that any type of criminal or civil liability is to attach in the
absence of scienter." 425 U.S. at 205.
Also, in the parenthetical that follows petitioner's
citation to Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663 n.23, he writes: "in criminal
prosecution, '[s]cienter — 'a mental state embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate or defraud,' [citation omitted] — is an
independent element of a Rule 10b-5 violation." Petition at 8-9
(alteration by petitioner). This parenthetical is followed by a
citation to Aaron. However, neither of those cases were decided
in the criminal context, and there is no reference to a "criminal
prosecution" at the cited page or footnote in Dirks.
4

Exchange Act of 1934 . . ., and Commission Rule 10b-5 promulgated
under that section of the 1934 Act."

446 U.S. at 682.

In Dirks,

the question was whether an officer of a broker-dealer firm
violated the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws
by disclosing material nonpublic information from "insiders" of a
corporation to investors.

463 U.S. at 648.

Noticeably absent from petitioner's discussion of Aaron
is that decision's holding that subsections (2) and (3) of
section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 do not require proof
of intent to defraud.

Section 17(a) provides in pertinent part:

It shall be unlawful for any person in the
offer or sale of any securities . . .,
directly or indirectly —
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means
of any untrue statement of a material fact or
any omission to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction,
practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon the purchaser.
Aaron, 446 U.S. at 687. The Court held that the language of
section 17(a), which is nearly identical to that of section 61-11, "requires scienter4 under § 17(a)(1), but not under
S 17(a)(2) or § 17(a)(3)."

Id. at 697. Focusing on the plain

4

The Court used "scienter" here in precisely the way it did
in Hochfelder: intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. 446
U.S. at 696.
5

language of subsection (2), the language at issue in the instant
case (see § 61-1-1(2)), the Court observed that M§ 17(a)(2),
which prohibits any person from obtaining money or property 'by
means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission
to state a material fact,' is devoid of any suggestion whatsoever
of a scienter requirement."

J[d. at 696.

Thus, contrary to petitioner's contention, the United
States Supreme Court case law interpreting federal securities
laws does not dictate that section 61-1-1(2) be construed to
require proof of an intent to defraud; all that is required is
proof that the defendant acted "willfully," as provided under
section 61-1-21. Not only does petitioner reach far beyond the
plain language of the statute in an effort to secure support for
his position, a violation of the fundamental principle of
statutory construction that " [unambiguous language in [a]
statute may not be interpreted to contradict its plain meaning,"
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989) (per curiam), he
misreads the federal case law.

Furthermore, numerous courts have

held that intent to defraud is not an element of the crime of
securities fraud under statutes similar to section 61-1-1(2).
See, e.g., Garvin v. Greenback, 856 F.2d 1392, 1397-98 (9th Cir.
1988) (construing Arizona statutes); Van Duvse v. Israel, 486 F.
Supp. 1382 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (construing Wisconsin statutes);
People v. Mitchell, 175 Mich.App. 83, 437 N.W.2d 304, 306-08
(Mich. App. 1989), appeal denied, 433 Mich. 895 (1990); People v.
Johnson, 213 Cal.App.3d 1369, 262 Cal.Rptr. 366 (1989), review
6

denied (Dec. 21, 1989); People v. Whitlow, 89 111.2d 322, 433
N.E.2d 629, 633-34, cert, denied, 459 U.S. 830 (1982); State v.
Tembv, 108 Wis.2d 521, 322 N.W.2d 522, 525-27 (1982); State v.
Fries, 214 Neb. 874, 337 N.W.2d 398, 404-05 (1983); State v.
Ross, 104 N.M. 23, 715 P.2d 471, 474 (N.M. App. 1986); State v.
Tarzian, 136 Ariz. 238, 665 P.2d 582, 585-86 (Ariz. App. 1983);
State v. Gunnison, 127 Ariz. 110, 618 P.2d 604, 606-07 (1980) (en
banc).
In sum, the court of appeals' rejection of petitioner's
contention concerning an intent to defraud is consistent with the
prevailing view in this country.

Review is not warranted, and

the Court should deny certiorari on this issue.
P. 46.

For the same reasons, certiorari should be denied on the

issue of whether "good faith" is a defense.
13.

See Utah R. App.

See Petition at 9-

As petitioner acknowledges, the good faith defense goes

"[h]and-in-hand with the scienter element."

JId. at 9.

Because

an intent to defraud is not required under section 61-1-1(2), a
good faith defense is not applicable.

See, e.g., Sparrow v.

United States, 402 F.2d 826, 828-29 (10th Cir. 1968) (making
clear that the good faith defense does not apply to "the
defendant's good faith as to the existence of any particular fact
or situation," and cautioning that although a good faith defense
exists with regard to the plan or scheme as a whole, "no matter
how firmly the defendant may believe in the plan, his belief will
not justify baseless, false, or reckless representations or
promises").

7

POINT II
PETITIONER FAILS TO PRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL
BASIS FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI TO REVIEW THE
COURT OF APPEALS' HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL
COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
ALLOWING THE STATE'S EXPERT WITNESS TO GIVE
OPINION TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE
"MATERIALITY" OF INFORMATION NOT DISCLOSED TO
INVESTORS
Petitioner asks this Court to grant certiorari to
review the court of appeals' holding that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in allowing the State's expert witness to
give opinion testimony concerning the "materiality" of
information petitioner failed to disclose to investors•

Although

the State conceded below that this issue was a close one,
petitioner fails to present a substantial basis under rule 46,
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, for granting certiorari.
The court of appeals reviewed the trial court's
evidentiary ruling on the expert testimony under an abuse of
discretion standard, noting that it would not reverse "in the
'absence of a clear showing of abuse.'"

Larsen, slip op. at 9

(quoting Lamb v. Banqart, 525 P.2d 602, 607-08 (Utah 1974)).

See

also State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991) ("As long as
the testimony 'will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue,' Utah R. Evid. 702, its
admission is generally within the discretion of the trial court
even if such testimony addresses an 'ultimate issue.'").

Cf.

State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 16 n.3 (Utah Apr. 23,
1991) ("[w]hether a piece of evidence is admissible is a question
of law, and we always review questions of law under a correctness
8

standard," but when the rule of evidence "vests a measure of
discretion in the trial court," the appellate court reverses only
if it concludes that the trial court exercised its discretion
"unreasonably")

Petitioner does not challenge the court's

application of that standard of review.

Furthermore, he does not

demonstrate that the court of appeals incorrectly concluded that
the trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion.

In fact,

where the issue was necessarily a close one, the court of appeals
correctly deferred to the trial court's decision which was
reasonably supported by the analysis in United States v. Leuben,
812 F.2d 179, 183 (5th Cir.), modified, 816 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir.
1987), and the broad construction this Court recently gave to
rules 702 and 704, Utah Rules of Evidence, in Span, 819 P.2d at
332 n.l ("Case law supports the proposition that an expert may
render an opinion that certain actions constitute a crime. . . .
As long as the testimony will 'assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence to determine a fact in issue,' . . . its
admission is generally within the discretion of the trial
court[.]").

In short, the court of appeals would have been

justified in finding an abuse of discretion "only if there was no
reasonable basis for the [trial court's] decision."

Crookston v.

Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 805 (Utah 1991) (applying
the "abuse of discretion" standard in reviewing trial court's
decision on motion for new trial) (footnote omitted).

Petitioner

does not demonstrate that the court of appeals was compelled to
find an abuse of discretion on the ground that there was no

9

reasonable basis for the trial court's decision; indeed, he
presents no argument to that effect. In essence, in seeking
certiorari, petitioner focuses on an alleged error in the trial
court's evidentiary ruling, rather than any substantial error in
the court of appeals' review

of that ruling.

This Court recently

made clear that such an approach is not appropriate for purposes
of certiorari:
We take this opportunity to remind the bar
that when exercising our certiorari
jurisdiction granted by section 78-2-2(3)(a),
we review a decision of the court of appeals,
not of the trial court. See Utah Code Ann. §
78-2-2(3)(a). Therefore, the briefs of the
parties should address the decision of the
court of appeals, not the decision of the
trial court. To restate the matter: We do
not grant certiorari to review de novo the
trial court's decision. See Utah R. App. P.
46.
Butterfield v. Okubo, No. 900272, slip op. at 6 n.2 (Utah Apr. 7,
1992).

Although the Court's admonition was made in the context

of deciding a case in which certiorari had been granted, that
admonition is equally applicable to petitions for certiorari.
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should
deny the instant petition for certiorari.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

of April, 1992.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAVID B. THOMPSON
Assistant Attorney General
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TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
RE:
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(filed February 7, 1992)

The attached copy of the above opinion replaces the original
copy you recently received. It contains minor additions in the
factual section which, because of computer problems, were not
included in the opinion as it was originally issued.
Please disregard the earlier copy; the attached copy
reflects the version of the opinion as it will appear in
published form.

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo

FEB 0 | 1992
$W/ T. Noonan
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeate

OPINION
(For Publication)

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 900473-CA

C. Dean Larsen,
F I L E D
(February 7, 1992)

Defendant and Appellant.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Leonard H. Russon
Attorneys:

Larry R. Keller, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and David B. Thompson, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Bench, Jackson, and Orme.
BENCH, Presiding Judge:
C. Dean Larsen appeals his conviction of eighteen counts of
securities fraud and theft on the ground that the Office of the
Utah Attorney General (the Attorney General) should have been
disqualified from the case for a conflict of interest. Larsen
further asserts that formal investigation into wrongdoing was
prompted by disclosure of confidential information from his
attorney, and constituted an ethical violation. Larsen also
challenges the admissibility of opinion testimony by the State's
expert, the court's failure to prohibit certain evidence, and its
refusal to give certain jury instructions. We affirm.
I.

FACTS

In the early 1970s, C. Dean Larsen, an attorney with a
background in real estate that predated his law career, filed
articles of incorporation for what became a real estate
development company known as Granada, Inc. (Granada). Larsen
served as president of Granada, a closely held corporation owned
by him and members of his family. According to Larsen, Granada
was "inactive" during the first few years after incorporation,

but in the mid '70s began buying land for real estate
development. The projects ranged from housing developments and
apartments, to office buildings and a shopping center. The
projects were mostly concentrated along Utah's Wasatch Front at
first, but eventually they included real estate developments in
Arizona and Nevada. The first fifteen or twenty projects were
also very successful.
In simple terms, the capital for most of the projects was
provided by Larsen's law clients, typically doctors and dentists
for whom he had set up professional corporations and pension
plans. These clients invested retirement and pension monies in
various limited partnerships Larsen formed for real estate
development. Granada served as general partner in many of the
limited partnerships, and acted as manager in others when a
different general partner was named. In all, close to one
hundred real estate limited partnerships were organized.1
Granada had no employees during the first eight years after
its incorporation, but hired its first employee in 1979. More
employees were hired as Granada grew. Larsen said that, with
this growth, he spent more of his time with Granada, and less
time with his law practice. Larsen thereupon hired Brian Farr, a
recently licensed attorney.
Larsen claims he hired Farr as his own personal attorney to
advise him in representing his clients, thereby creating an
attorney-client relationship nested within another attorneyclient relationship. Although Larsen disputes that Farr was ever
an associate, except briefly, he referred several legal matters
to Farr to be performed on behalf of his clients. Larsen also
assigned Farr some legal work of a personal nature, such as a
parking violation by an office vehicle, pro bono litigation, a
land sale, and preparing amendments to an unrelated family
partnership as new family members were born. Larsen further
assigned Farr some Granada-related projects, such as evictions
and a health plan.
Larsen supervised Farr's work throughout their working
"relationship." Farr reported the hours he worked to Larsen, who
then billed the clients. In turn, the clients paid Larsen, and
Larsen paid Farr for his services through an account in the name
of Larsen's professional corporation. The Larsen-Farr
relationship lasted approximately four years.

1. Of these entities, only the limited partnerships known as The
Oaks, Ltd., Three Crowns, Baseline, and EFF Fund, Ltd., were
involved in the forty-two count amended information.

900473-CA
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Larsen and Farr sometimes conferred together with clients.
According to Farr, during one such meeting, after setting up a
professional corporation and a pension plan for a doctor and his
wife, Larsen explained about certain reporting requirements that
were involved. Larsen informed the clients that an accountant, a
bank or a specialized pension accounting service could discharge
those duties. Farr asserted that Larsen discouraged the clients
from using a bank or an accountant, but recommended that they use
Professional Pension Services (PPS), an entity that Larsen said
dealt exclusively with pension matters. Larsen also told the
clients that if they were to use PPS, they would like its liquid
mortgage fund because investments in the fund required no minimum
deposit and carried no penalty for early withdrawal. It appears
from the record that PPS was loaning the fund proceeds to
Granada-related projects.
Farr claimed that Larsen failed, in recommending PPS, to
disclose his former ownership of or continuing influence over
PPS. Farr believed these omissions could put the clients'
investments at risk. After the meeting, Farr contacted PPS at
the request of the clients for information about the liquid
mortgage fund. He learned that PPS did not have an offering
statement or any agreement regarding the use of the liquid
mortgage fund. Farr's concerns were further heightened when he
was unable to find any recorded trust deeds securing the loans.
After reviewing files at Granada and receiving additional
information from PPS, Farr discovered that these problems were
widespread.
Farr spoke to Larsen about what he had learned and perceived
to be a problem. Larsen assured him that the matter would be
resolved. Despite these assurances, nothing was done. Farr
continued to press Larsen for a resolution and even volunteered
to handle the matter. Larsen rejected the offer, and hired
outside counsel to research any possible violations of state
securities laws. As a result of the growing tension between
Larsen and Farr, their work relationship was severed in 1982.2
Following the breakup, Farr continued to be concerned about
the interests of former "clients," especially their investments
in Granada. As a result of what he perceived to be ongoing
securities violations, Farr contacted Constance White of the Utah
Securities Division (Securities Division) in 1983. Farr told
2. Larsen claims that
reason for the breakup
to the Utah Securities
view of Larsen's claim
any meaningful sense.

900473-CA

Farr's failure to make partner was the
as well as his motive in reporting Larsen
Division, a rather telling statement in
that Farr was never even an associate in

*1

White what he knew about Granada based on what he had seen, was
told, or had heard. White then turned the matter over to the
Securities Division staff for investigation. Later, in 1986,
Farr was employed by the Attorney General in the Health Division.
Concurrent with these events, Granada began to experience
serious cash flow shortages and its investments suffered. Larsen
claimed he believed Granada was solvent, and sought Securities
Division approval for a new mortgage fund offering by Granada.
In early 1987, Larsen learned that the figures he relied on were
inaccurate. The Securities Division told Larsen that Granada
would be placed in receivership if Granada did not petition for
bankruptcy. Granada then petitioned for bankruptcy in February
1987.
On October 19, 1988, the State filed a fifty-count criminal
complaint against Larsen. The complaint alleged that Larsen had
committed securities fraud and related acts of dishonesty in the
sale of securities. Larsen was bound over on forty-two counts
following a motion to amend and a lengthy preliminary hearing.
Larsen then moved to sever the trial into five parts in order to
more closely align the victims, dates, transactions, and entities
involved. The trial court granted the motion and Larsen went to
trial on the eighteen counts of securities fraud involving EFF
Fund, Ltd. (EFF Fund or EFF).
Larsen then moved to disqualify the Attorney General on the
ground that Farr's subsequent employment with the State, when
coupled with his previous disclosures to the Securities Division,
posed a conflict of interest that should have been imputed to the
entire office of the Attorney General. After a two-day hearing
in which Farr, Larsen, and White testified, the district court
denied the motion.
Larsen filed a written opposition to the ruling, and filed
an interlocutory appeal, both of which were denied. Before
trial, Larsen moved to prohibit testimony about any entities
other than EFF Fund, but the motion was denied. Larsen also
moved to prohibit inquiry into the investigation by the
Securities Division that led to the eventual suspension of EFF.
That motion was deferred until trial. After a two-week trial, a
jury found Larsen guilty of all eighteen counts.
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II.
A.

DISQUALIFICATION

Attorney-Client Relationship

Larsen argues that the Attorney General should have been
disqualified from prosecuting the case against him because Farr's
employment with the Health Division mandated disqualification
under the imputed conflict of interest rule. See Utah Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.10 (1990). Larsen also contends that
his conviction should be reversed because Farr's disclosures to
the Securities Division violated certain ethical duties of
confidentiality owed to Larsen as a former client of Farr. The
threshold issue of both these arguments is whether an attorneyclient relationship existed. Cf. Williams v. Barber. 765 P.2d
887, 889 (Utah 1988)(threshold inquiry in legal malpractice is
whether an attorney-client relationship existed). The trial
court found that Farr was not Larsen's attorney except for a few
minor transactional matters unrelated to securities or the
criminal charges against him in this case, and denied Larsen7s
motion to disqualify.
To prove that the trial court's findings of fact were
clearly erroneous, "an appellant must marshal all evidence in
favor of the facts as found by the trial court and then
demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to
support the findings of fact." Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 198,
199-200 (Utah 1990). If an appellant fails to marshal the
evidence, "the appellate court assumes that the record supports
the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review of the
accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the
application of that law in the case." Id. at 199.
Larsen challenges several factual findings of the trial
court concerning the nature or extent of their professional
relationship,3 but admits he "may have fallen somewhat short" in
3. Larsen challenges the following factual findings on appeal:
(1) that Farr was an associate of Larsen in the practice of law;
(2) that Farr occasionally performed legal work for Larsen
personally; (3) that the legal work involved minor transactions
unrelated to the matters or issues pending in this prosecution;
(4) that Farr did not represent Larsen while serving common
clients; (5) that, if an attorney client relationship existed
between Farr and Larsen, it was related only to minor
transactional matters, and not to any matter substantially
related to the prosecution; (6) that Farr was not general counsel
for Granada; (7) that Farr performed legal work for Granada in a
(continued...)
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marshaling the evidence. Larsen even goes so far as to suggest
that he was prevented from doing so because of page limitations
imposed upon him.4 Our insistence on compliance with the
marshaling requirement is not a case of exalting hypertechnical
adherence to form over substance. "A reviewing court is entitled
to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited
and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may
dump the burden of argument and research." State v. Bishop, 753
P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)(quoting Williamson v. Oosahl, 92 111.
App. 3d 1087, 1089, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (1981)). The marshaling
requirement provides the appellate court the basis from which to
conduct a meaningful review of facts challenged on appeal. See
Wright v. Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 512 n.2 (Utah App.
1990)(the purpose of the marshaling requirement is to spare
appellate courts the onerous burden of combing through the record
in search of supporting factual matters).
Larsen argued only "selected evidence favorable to [his]
position," Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah
1991), without presenting any of the evidence supporting the
trial courts findings. Larsen's approach "does not begin to
meet the marshaling burden [he] must carry." Id. Because Larsen
failed to marshal evidence in support of the trial court's
findings and show how they are clearly erroneous, we affirm the
factual findings of the trial court that Farr was not Larsen's
personal attorney, except in a few minor transactional matters
unrelated to this prosecution.5
3. (...continued)
few minor matters; (8) that the work was unrelated to the matters
and issues pending in this prosecution; and (9) that Farr's
representation ceased prior to 1983.
4. Larsen was allowed to file an overlength brief of 81 pages
after his request to file a 120-page brief was denied. The 81page brief was supplemented by five volumes of supporting addenda
that made extensive reference to memoranda of points and
authorities in the briefs filed below, thereby, circumventing any
size restrictions. Given this leeway, the argument that Larsen
was prevented from marshaling is somewhat disingenuous.
5. Larsen asserts that it was his subjective belief that Farr
was his personal attorney in all things, but fails to present any
evidence of conduct that would warrant an implied attorney-client
relationship. See, e.g., Maraulies v. Upchurch. 696 P.2d 1195,
1200 (Utah 1985)(an attorney-client relationship was implied
where the law firm had represented a limited partnership in which
the would-be clients had invested); Breuer-Harrison. Inc. v.
(continued...)
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B.

Substantial Factual Relationship Test

Having affirmed the trial court's finding regarding the
limited nature of the attorney-client relationship between Farr
and Larsen, we review its decision to not disqualify the Attorney
General. The parties agree that the applicable standard
governing disqualification is set forth in Rule 1.10(b) of the
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides as follows
(with our emphasis):
When a lawyer becomes associated with a
firm, the firm may not knowingly represent a
person in the same or a substantially
factually related matter in which that
lawyer, or firm with which the lawyer has
associated, had previously represented a
client whose interests are materially adverse
to that person and about whom the lawyer had
acquired information protected by Rules 1.6
and 1.9(b) that is material to the matter.
Whether the matters in which Farr represented Larsen were
"the same or substantially factually related" to the current case
is a critical factor in the disqualification calculus. The trial
court found that Farr's representation of Larsen was limited to a
handful of legal matters unrelated to the securities or criminal
charges against him.
On appeal, Larsen offered no argument that the matters in
which the trial court found Farr had represented him were the
same or substantially related to the matters for which
disqualification is now sought. Unless a substantial factual
relationship is shown between the matters, disqualification is
not required under the rule because the most basic element is not
present. Our conclusion that there is no substantial
relationship is supported by the fact that Farr learned of the
perceived securities problems outside the scope of the legal
representation of Larsen expressly undertaken. When Farr
5. (...continued)
Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 727-28 (Utah App. 1990)(although an
attorney-client relationship may be implied by the parties'
conduct, a would-be client's belief that a professional
relationship exists must have been reasonably induced by the
attorney's conduct). Cf. Atkinson v. IHC KQSPS.. Inc.. 798 P.2d
733, 735 (Utah 1990)(courts consider who the attorney claimed to
have represented as shown by the pleadings and other documents;
the existence of an employment contract or retainer agreement;
and the parties' admissions about tl%e relationship).
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confronted Larsen about the problems, Larsen rejected Farr's
offer to handle the matter and hired outside counsel.
Absent a substantial factual relationship between the former
and present matters, no attorney-client relationship can be
imposed on Farr with respect to this litigation, and "there could
be no conflict of interest created" by Farr's subsequent
employment with the Attorney General. Maraulies v. Unchurch. 696
P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1985). Accordingly, we conclude that,
inasmuch as disqualification of the Attorney General was not
mandated under Rule 1.10(b) of the Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
allow the Attorney General to remain as counsel. Id.
Further, we also reject Larsen's argument that the mere
appearance of impropriety is sufficient to overturn his
conviction. In State v. Ford, 793 P.2d 397 (Utah App. 1990),
this court said that a criminal defendant "is not automatically
entitled to a reversal of his conviction" merely because of an
apparent violation of a rule of professional conduct. Id. at
400. If Farr violated any ethical rules, the "appropriate remedy
lies with the disciplinary arm of the Utah State Bar." Id.
III.

EXPERT OPINION

Larsen argues that the court erred in allowing the former
registration chief of the Securities Division, an attorney now
serving as a securities examiner in Nevada, to offer expert
opinion testimony concerning the "materiality" of information not
disclosed to investors. Larsen asserts that the opinion was
improper legal testimony, not factual testimony. Whether or not
the information was "material" is an element of securities
fraud.6

6*
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It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine
the suitability of expert testimony in a particular case, State
v, Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1982), and we will not
reverse that determination on appeal in the "absence of a clear
showing of abuse." Lamb v. Bancrart, 525 P.2d 602, 607-08 (Utah
1974). Expert testimony is suitable if it will "assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue . . . ." Utah R. Evid. 702. In general, expert testimony
is suitable in securities fraud cases because the technical
nature of securities is not within the knowledge of the average
layman or a subject within common experience and would help the
jury understand the issues before them. See Dixon v. Stewart,
658 P.2d 591, 597 (Utah 1982).
Under Rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, expert opinion
is "not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be
decided by the trier of fact".7 Despite the appropriateness of
expert testimony on an ultimate issue, Rule 704 was not intended
to allow experts to give legal conclusions. See Davidson v.
Prince. 813 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Utah App. 1991)(citing Owen v. KerrMcGee Corp.. 698 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1983)).
The danger of allowing expert opinion couched as a legal
standard is that "the jurors will turn to the expert, rather than
to the judge, for guidance on the applicable law." 3 Jack B.
Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence, f 704[02].
See also First Sec. Bank v. Banberrv Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253,
1258 (Utah 1989)(legal duty owed by trust deed trustee to trustor
is question of law to be determined by the court, and not
question of fact suitable for testimony by expert in real estate
law); Ashton v. Ashton. 733 P.2d 147, 153 (Utah 1987)(attorney's
expert opinion as to effect of joint tenant's conveyance was
inadmissible statement of law). The determination of whether
expert opinion embraces an ultimate factual issue or constitutes
a legal conclusion is a difficult call because "[t]here is no
bright line between permissible questions under Rule 704 and

6.

(...continued)

(3) engage in any act,
practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit upon any person.
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1989):
7. Black's Law Dictionary 1057 (6th ed. 1991) defines an
ultimate issue as "[t]hat question which must finally be answered
as, for example, the defendant's negligence is the ultimate issue
in a personal injury action."
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those that call for overbroad legal responses,"
P.2d at 1231.8
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The distinction between a factual evidentiary showing of
materiality and impermissible opinion on the legal question of
materiality was underscored in United States v. Lueben. 812 F.2d
179, 183 (5th Cir. 1987). In Lueben, the Fifth Circuit held that
expert opinion on materiality was admissible as being factoriented. The court reasoned that whether certain false
statements would have had "the capacity to influence" a loan
officer as a factual element of the governments case was
distinguishable from the question of whether the statements were
legally "material." Id. at 184. The government was required to
make an initial factual showing of materiality as an element of
its case. The Fifth Circuit ruled that the district court,
therefore, committed reversible error in not allowing expert
testimony since the defendant would have been entitled to a
directed verdict of acquittal if the government was unable to
prove each element of its case. Id. at 185.
Although Lueben involved a prosecution for making false
statements in connection with a loan application and tax returns,
rather than securities violations, the case illustrates the
distinction between permissible fact-oriented questions as to
materiality and impermissible legal conclusions referred to in
the cases cited by Larsen.9 Accordingly, we are persuaded by
Lueben that use of the term "material" may be admitted as
permissible fact-oriented testimony. Upon review of the record,
we conclude that the expert in this case used the term "material"
in a factual sense.
8. See State v. Span. 170 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 17-18, 26 n.l (Utah
1991)(arson investigator testified that fire was intentionally
set); American Concept Ins. Co. v. Lochhead. 751 P.2d 271, 273
(Utah App. 1988)(expert could submit affidavit as to ultimate
issues of lack of good faith and fair dealing in suit for
tortious interference with business relations). See also Davis
v. Mason County. 927 F.2d 1473, 1484-85 (9th Cir. 1991)(police
expert could testify that county sheriff was "reckless" in
failing to adequately train his deputies, and that there was a
causal link between this recklessness and plaintiffs's injuries);
United States v. Nixon. 918 F.2d 895, 905 (11th Cir. 1990)(police
detective could use the term "conspiracy," since testimony was
factual and not a legal conclusion).
9. See United States v. Scop. 846 F.2d 135 (2nd Cir. 1988);
Adalman v. Baker. Watts & Co.. 807 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1986); and
Marx & Co.. Inc. v. Diner's Club. Inc.. 550 F.2d 505 (2nd Cir.
1977).
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Since the State is required to prove all essential elements
of a crime, and materiality is an element of the offense charged
in this case, there was no abuse of discretion in allowing the
expert testimony. See State v. Florez, 777 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah
1989)(state has a right to introduce evidence on every element).
Furthermore, any confusion that might have been created by the
casual use of the term "material" and its legal definition could
have been corrected with a jury instruction. See Conger v. Tel
Tech. Inc.. 798 P.2d 279, 283 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Ortiz.
782 P.2d 959, 962 (Utah App. 1989).
IV.

MOTIONS IN LIMINE
A.

EFF Fund

Larsen brought a motion in limine to prohibit the State from
introducing testimony concerning any entities other than EFF Fund
on the ground that any such evidence was irrelevant to the
eighteen counts of securities fraud severed for trial.10 The
State asserted that the evidence was relevant because: EFF had
been set up similarly to the other entities; Larsen had told
investors that EFF would be operated the same way as PPS; the
claim as to similarity was an inducement for investment; and the
partnerships all received money from EFF because of their
structural similarity.
The State also claimed that Larsen had promised the
investors that the loans were secured by promissory notes, but
that these documents were only partially completed or nonexistent. Although the trial court instructed the State that it
could not delve into specific acts of misconduct, the court
denied Larsen7s motion, stating that the government was entitled
to pursue its theory of the case. On appeal, Larsen claims his
conviction should be reversed because of prejudicial error
inasmuch as the evidence was irrelevant and immaterial.
"Relevant evidence" is defined as that "evidence having a
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable" and is admissible unless excluded. Utah R. Evid. 401
10. In particular, Larsen objected to the State's inquiries into
how Granada raised money to acquire and develop properties; how
the liquid mortgage fund or its counterpart, the PPS fund,
operated; how EFF money was used; what limitations were imposed
on the fund; whether EFF was ever investigated; the significance
of certain portions of a registration statement; and which
properties received monies from EFF.

and 402. See generally State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah
1986)• Rule 403 states that "relevant evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is found to be substantially outweighed by
the potential for unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Utah
R. Evid. 403 (emphasis added). Thus, in determining whether
relevant evidence should be excluded, "[e]vidence that tends to
prove an element of the crime is admissible. Evidence which goes
to general disposition or that is unfairly prejudicial is not
admissible." State v. Jamison. 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App.
1989) .
The explanations given by the State regarding the relevance
of the other entities to EFF were cogent to the legal test of
relevance because they tended to make the existence of facts
concerning the alleged securities violations more or less
probable than without the evidence. The trial court had a legal
basis, therefore, to admit the evidence. See State v. Ramirez.
159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 16 n.3 (1990).
Larsen does not challenge the merits of any of the reasons
given by the State as to relevance. Larsen's claim as to
relevance is based solely on the grounds that the EFF Fund, the
liquid mortgage fund, and the other partnerships were separate
entities. Larsen mistakenly asserts that the trial court's
severance of those claims bars any discussion of those entities.
The relevance of these other entities to the other charges, as
the trial court pointed out, does not preclude their relevance to
the EFF Fund.
Larsen also made no argument on how evidence of the other
entities confused the issues or misled the jury. The trial
court's cautionary instruction prohibiting the State from delving
into other acts of misconduct adequately balanced the apparent
concerns for unfair prejudice. The trial court, therefore, did
not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.
B.

Investigation by the Securities Division

Larsen also brought a motion in limine to prevent testimony
regarding an investigation of Granada by the Securities Division,
claiming that the evidence would be "highly prejudicial."
Without holding a hearing or ruling on the motion, the trial
court indicated in a minute entry that consideration of the
matter would be deferred until trial. The testimony was later
admitted at trial over Larsen's objection. On appeal, Larsen
contends the testimony should have been excluded as impermissible
character evidence under Rule 404 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
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[I]n order to preserve a contention of
error in the admission of evidence for
appeal, a defendant must raise a timely
objection to the trial court in clear and
specific terms. Where there [is] no clear or
specific objection on the basis of character
evidence or unfair prejudice and the specific
ground for objection [is] not clear from the
context of the question or the testimony, the
theory cannot be raised on appeal.11
State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1222 (Utah 1986) (footnote
omitted).
Although Larsen claims he objected "at every opportunity at
trial," no Rule 404 character evidence objections were made.
Larsen objected to the State asking questions in improper form,
assuming facts not in evidence, asking for irrelevant and
immaterial evidence, and asking for evidence which, although
relevant, should have been excluded under Rule 403.
Larsen's objections as to form, relevance, materiality,
leading nature and so on do not call the court's attention to
impermissible character evidence and the theory is not clear from
the context. See State v. Eldredcre, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah),
cert, denied.
U.S.
, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989); Schreuder, 726
P.2d at 1222. Because no proper objection was made, Larsen has
not preserved the issue for appeal and we do not address the
issue further.
V.

REMAINING ISSUES

A.

Specific Intent

Larsen argues that the trial court's refusal to give his
proposed jury instructions on specific intent was reversible
error. Although a criminal defendant is entitled to have the
jury instructed on his theory of the crime if there is any basis
in the evidence to support that theory, jury instructions should
not incorrectly or misleadingly state the law. State v. Alv, 782
P.2d 549, 550 (Utah App. 1989)).
The common law terms "general intent" and "specific intent"
have not been used in the Utah criminal code since substantive
amendments in 1973. See State v. Calamity. 735 P.2d 39, 43 (Utah
1987). See also Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1990).
The Utah Code specifies willfulness as the culpable mental
state for securities fraud. "Any person who willfully violates
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any provision of this chapter . . . or willfully violates any
rules or order under this chapter . . . shall upon conviction be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than three
years, or both." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (1990)(emphasis
added). The trial court, therefore, properly instructed the jury
that the culpable mental state for the crime of securities fraud
is "willfulness," rather than specific intent as proposed by
Larsen. The court defined willfulness as follows:
You are instructed that a person engages in
conduct intentionally or with intent or
willfully, with respect to the nature of his
conduct or to the result of his conduct, when
it is his conscious desire to engage in the
conduct or cause the result.
The instruction on willfulness mirrors the statutory
definition of willfulness under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1)
(1990). Moreover, because "willfully" is alternatively listed
with "intentionally" or "with intent," the instruction is not
inconsistent with State v. Facer, 552 P.2d 110, 111 (Utah 1976)
(crime of securities fraud does not require element of loss and
causal connection, since the crime is complete under section 611-1(1) if defendant intentionally employs any device, scheme or
artifice to defraud). Inasmuch as willfulness is the culpable
mental state, a separate instruction on specific intent was
unnecessary.
B.

Other Jury Instructions and Leading Questions

We have also reviewed the remaining issues raised on appeal
and deem them to be without merit. In our discretion, we do not
address them further. See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888
(Utah 1989).
VI.

CONCLUSION

Farr's subsequent employment with the Attorney General did
not mandate disqualification because there was no attorney-client
relationship between him and Larsen that would have created a
conflict of interest. Expert opinion on the issue of materiality
was admissible as fact-oriented testimony concerning an element
of the government's prima facie case. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of entities other than
EFF Fund because of their relevance to the issues of securities
fraud. Larsen did not object to the character evidence
complained of, and thereby failed to preserve the issue for
appeal. The culpable mental state of securities fraud is
willfulness and the trial court's instruction on the element was
proper.
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Accordingly, Larsen's conviction and sentence are affirmed,
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Russell W. Bench,
Presiding Judge
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Gregory^. Orme, Judge

